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Casenote
WIPE OUT IN ACLU v. JOHNSON: CAN ANY REGULATION
OF SURFING THE 'NET WITHSTAND
CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet (" 'Net") is an increasingly powerful medium in
twenty-first century society, interconnecting people and ideas on a
global scale. Never before has the dissemination of information,
images and messages been so effortless and unrestricted as it has
been in cyberspace. However, this freedom does not come without
potential liabilities. Inevitably, the limits of free speech circum-
scribed by governmental regulation must weigh in to protect citi-
zens from damaging messages that flow through this medium. One
example of this regulation, created to protect minors from harmful
materials exhibited on the Internet, was a New Mexico statute
criminalizing such intentional communications.' The New Mexico
legislature, similar to other governmental bodies in recent years,
attempted to stop minors from viewing sexually explicit materials
on the Internet by enacting a statute prohibiting adults from dis-
seminating such materials. 2 Speech restrictions like New Mexico's
inevitably trigger the need for judicial review within the constitu-
tional confines of the First Amendment.3 Furthermore, because
the statute restricts the Internet, the courts must review it under the
Commerce Clause as well. 4
This Note examines the constitutionality of these cyberspace
speech regulations as set forth specifically in ACLU v. Johnson.5
First, Section II paints the factual setting for the enactment of the
legislation and its constitutional challenge. Next, Section III de-
scribes the complex legal background behind Internet regulation,
1. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2(A) (Michie 1998) (prohibiting dissemina-
tion of materials harmful to minors).
2. See id.; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (examining constitution-
ality of two provisions of Communications Decency Act of 1996).
3. See ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 1999).
4. See id. at 1160 (implicating First Amendment and Commerce Clause
challenges).
5. 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999).
(137)
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including both First Amendment analysis and Commerce Clause
analysis. Section IV then delineates the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in holding the New Mexico
statute violated the Constitution.6 Finally, Section V critically ana-
lyzes the reasoning of the court, while Section VI discusses the im-
plications of the decision on Internet use and the potential for any
governmental regulation of the medium to withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
II. FACTS
In its 1998 session, the New Mexico legislature responded to
the public outcry for Internet regulation with regard to minors by
enacting a statute criminalizing the "dissemination of material that
is harmful to a minor by computer. ' 7 Such a regulation was de-
signed in part to eliminate the conduct of adults who engage inten-
tionally in these injurious communications with children.8 In a
medium as anonymous and expansive as the Internet, however,
there is significant potential for these regulations to be unconstitu-
6. See id. at 1152 (holding that New Mexico statute prohibiting harmful mater-
ials to minors over Internet violated Constitution).
7. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2(A) (Michie 1998) (setting forth criteria for
criminal liability in dissemination of harmful materials). The statute explicitly
states:
Dissemination of material that is harmful to a minor by computer consists
of the use of a computer communications system that allows the input,
output, examination, or transfer of computer data or computer programs
from one computer to another, to knowingly and intentionally initiate or
engage in communication with a person under eighteen years of age
when such communication in whole or in part depicts actual or simulated
nudity, sexual intercourse or any other sexual conduct. Whoever com-
mits dissemination of material that is harmful to a minor by computer is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id. The statute itself provides the following defenses:
(1) In good faith taken reasonable, effective and appropriate actions
under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to inde-
cent materials on computer, including any method that is feasible with
available technology;
(2) Restricted access to indecent materials by requiring the use of a veri-
fied credit card, debit account, adult access code or adult personal identi-
fication number; or
(3) In good faith established a mechanism such as labeling, segregation
or other means that enables indecent material to be automatically
blocked or screened by software or other capability reasonably available
to persons who wish to effect such blocking or screening and the defen-
dant has not otherwise solicited a minor not subject to such screening or
blocking capabilities to access the indecent material or to circumvent
screening or blocking.
Id.
8. See Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1152 (stating that dissemination of materials harm-
ful to minors is valid compelling state interest).
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REGULATION OF THE 'NET
tionally overbroad. 9 Thus, "various organizations and individuals
who maintain or use computer systems to provide access to a range
of information" accessible to New Mexicans via the Internet banded
together to petition the court for an injunction barring enforce-
ment of this statute. 10 Although the intended (harmful) speech is
arguably covered by the statute, the statute also includes women's
health issues, rape, literary and artistic works, and gay and lesbian
materials.I 1 The plaintiffs in this action argued these are legitimate
materials that unduly fall within the scope of the statute, rendering
it an over-expansive regulation. 12 Thus, the plaintiffs challenged
the New Mexico statute as facially invalid under the First Amend-
ment, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause.13 In
ACLUv.Johnson, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of the prelim-
inary injunction against the statute, finding that the plaintiffs had
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their First
Amendment and Commerce Clause claims.' 4
III. BACKGROUND
Although state regulation of indecent materials on the In-
ternet is a fairly recent development, Congress has consistently at-
tempted to regulate such speech within the context of various
media of protected expression. 15 These attempts have resulted in a
9. See id. at 1155.
10. ACLU v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1026 (D.N.M. 1998).
11. See Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1153 (finding New Mexico statute constitutionally
violative).
12. See id. at 1155 (asserting facial First Amendment challenges to statute).
13. See id. at 1153. Plaintiffs filed suit two months before the statute was to
become effective. See id.
14. See id. at 1152. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss at the district court
level. Their claims included: (1) ripeness; (2) that the Eleventh Amendment
barred the suit; and (3) that the court should abstain from judgment until the New
Mexico Supreme Court had time to interpret the statutory language. See id. at
1153. The district court, however, granted the injunction, and the defendants ap-
pealed the court's legal conclusions. See id. at 1154. The district court held that
the statute violated First and Fourteenth Amendments because it "effectively
ban [ned] speech that is constitutionally protected for adults;" it did not "directly
and materially advance a compelling government interest;" it was not "the least
restrictive means of serving its stated interest;" it "interfere[d] with rights of minors
to access and view material that to them is protected by the First Amendment;" it
was "substantially over-broad (sic];" and it prevented "people from communication
and accessing information anonymously." ACLU v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1024,
1033 (D.N.M. 1998). The Tenth Circuit upheld these findings. See Johnson, 194
F.3d at 1152.
15. See Alan Lewine, Making Cyberspace Safe for Children: A First Amendment Anal-
ysis of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 18 HAMLINEJ. PUB. L. & POL'y 78, 80
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sizable arsenal of caselaw applicable in analyzing Johnson under a
First Amendment review and, more recently, in the Commerce
Clause arena. 16
To discuss effectively the court's reasoning in Johnson, this sec-
tion first articulates the traditional, First Amendment review of
speech regulations. Next, this section shows how the Internet is un-
like other speech contexts and requires a more novel approach
within this constitutional framework. Finally, this section delineates
the foundations of traditional Commerce Clause analysis and its
particular application to the Internet via the New Mexico statute.
A. Traditional Review of Speech Regulations
The First Amendment dictates that "Congress shall make no
law . .. abridging the freedom of speech ... -"17 Unarguably, this
Amendment has been "the cornerstone of our ability to communi-
cate ideas freely, although not absolutely, to others without govern-
mental interference." 18 The focus of that statement within
traditional jurisprudence has been on the states' attempts to regu-
late this fundamental liberty. 19 The constitutional limitations of
governmental regulation are historically drawn according to the
type of restricted speech at issue. 20 As stated earlier, not all forms
of speech garner First Amendment protection; courts will only pro-
tect speech which is deemed as having "de minimus" social value. 21
Thus, there is a constitutional distinction between the protection of
what has been termed "indecent" speech and "obscene" speech
16. See id. (discussing applicable caselaw in area of Internet regulation).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment thereby applies to the states
through incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CoNsT. amend.
XIV.
18. Brian M. Werst, A Survey of the First Amendment "Indecency" Legal Doctrine
and its Inapplicability to Internet Regulation: A Guide for Protecting Children from Internet
Indecency After Reno v. ACLU, 33 GONZ. L. Rv. 207, 219 (1998) (citing C. Richard
Martin, Censorship in Cyberspace, 34 Hous. L. REv. 45 (1996)). In line with the con-
struction of most of the Constitution, the First Amendment was "intentionally
drafted in broad terms to protect the ideas of the ever-changing societal minority
from censorship and account for technological and societal transformations." Id.
19. See id. (discussing free speech ideals underlying First Amendment).
20. See id. at 225 (distinguishing between indecent and obscene materials).
21. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding that
.utterances . . . of such slight social value [were] clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality"); see also Roth v. California, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957). Despite falling within the protection of the First Amendment, "indecent
material is subject to regulation due to its 'slight social value.'" See Werst, supra
note 18, at 225 (1998).
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under the First Amendment.22 The United States Supreme Court's
rationale for this differentiation is that obscenity has no social im-
portance and was not intended to receive protection.2 3 Thus, if
materials are found to be "indecent," and not rising to the level of
"obscene," then they typically will be guarded by the First
Amendment.24
The Court, recognizing it is imperative to clarify the distinction
between indecent and obscene speech, fashioned a benchmark to
compare offensive speech in Roth v. California.25 Justice Brennan
set forth the first test for finding obscenity as, "whether to the aver-
age person, applying contemporary community standards, the dom-
inant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the
prurient interest."26 The finding of obscenity has from this point
on been contigent on some variation of these original standards. 27
In the same year that the obscenity standard was set forth in
Roth, the Supreme Court in Butler v. Michigan28 reviewed a Michi-
gan statute restricting the accessibility of such harmful materials to
22. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 484-85 (holding that obscene speech is not constitu-
tionally protected).
23. See id. at 484 (setting forth original standard for finding obscenity).
24. See id. It is important to note that in Stanley v. Georgia, the Court held that
the First Amendment does not permit the "mere private possession" of obscene
materials to be a crime. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969).
25. 354 U.S. at 489. The statute in question in Roth was a federal obscenity
statute making the mailing of material that was "obscene, lewd, lascivious, or
filthy.., or [any] other publication of an indecent character" criminal. Id. at 479
n. 1.
26. Id. at 489. For a discussion of how the Roth test has been subsequently re-
formulated by the Miller court, see infra note 42 and accompanying text.
27. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20-23 (1973) (re-formulating obscen-
ity standard first set forth in Roth).
28. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 381 (1957) (holding that First
Amendment does not require all materials to be fit for children). The Michigan
Penal Code provided:
Any person who shall import, print, publish, sell, possess with the intent
to sell, design, prepare, loan, give away, distribute or offer for sale, any
book, magazine, newspaper, writing, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper,
print, picture, drawing, photograph, publication or other thing, includ-
ing any recordings, containing obscene, immoral, lewd or lascivious lan-
guage, or obscene, immoral, lewd or lascivious prints, pictures, figures or
descriptions, tending to incite minors to violent or depraved immoral
acts, manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth, or shall
introduce into any family, school or place of education or shall buy, pro-
cure, receive or have in his possession, any such book, pamphlet, maga-
zine, newspaper, writing, ballad, printed paper, print, picture, drawing,
photograph, publication or other thing, either for the purpose of sale,
exhibition, loan or circulation, or with intent to introduce the same into
any family, school or place of education, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.
MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.343 (repealed 1957).
2001]
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minors. In Butler, the Court focused on the potential over-expan-
sive reach of the statute. 29 The Court determined that the statute
unduly restricted the access of adults to these materials and was not
tailored to effectuate its intended purpose.30 As Justice Frankfurter
warned, a state could not reduce its adult population to "reading
only [material] that was fit for children. ' 31 As a result, the Court
struck down the statute on First Amendment grounds. 32
Although Roth outlined the definitive standard for obscenity,
the Court elaborated on the application of the doctrine in Ginsberg
v. New York. 33 The particular issue confronting the Court was the
constitutionality of a state statute designed to "assure minors a
more restrictive right than the similar right provided to adults in
determining what sexual material they were permitted to read or
see."3 4 The Court held that the state has an interest in protecting
the well-being of its children and "safeguard[ing]" them from
abuses that might prevent their growth as citizens. 35 Thus, state in-
fringement of potentially protected freedoms may be justified by a
state interest in shielding minors from harm - in this case obscene
materials. 36 The key relevance of Ginsberg is Justice Brennan's dec-
laration that a law effectuating protection of minors from obscene
materials need only pass a rational basis test to be constitutional. 37
Thus, a compelling state interest is not necessary to uphold a stat-
29. See Butler, 352 U.S. at 383 (warning that regulations cannot impinge on
adult expression).
30. See id.
31. Id. The Court highlighted that the First Amendment did not warrant
such a wholesale impingement on free speech so as to prohibit purely "adult"
materials. Id.
32. See id. (holding that First Amendment does not require all materials to be
fit for children).
33. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). Ginsberg, the owner of a luncheonette, was con-
victed of selling "girlie" magazines in violation of a New York penal statute. See id.
at 631.
34. MichaelJ. Merchant, Establishing the Boundaries of First Amendment Protection
for Speech in the Cyberspace Frontier: Reno v. ACLU, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 429, 434
(1998) (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640).
35. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639-40; see also Prince v. Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
36. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640 (holding that protecting minors from harm is
compelling governmental interest for purposes of First Amendment review).
37. See Merchant, supra note 34, at 435 (discussing relevance of Ginsberg in
Reno Court's decision). The defendants in Johnson heavily relied upon the reason-
ing of the Court in both Ginsberg and Reno. See ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149,
1156-58 (10th Cir. 1999).
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ute suppressing obscenity whereas it is traditionally necessary for
indecent materials. 38
The Supreme Court in Miller v. California finally set forth a test
specifically designed to evaluate regulations of sexually explicit
materials available to minors.39 The central emphasis of the
Court's opinion was on the requisite narrow construction of the
statute, which criminalized the conduct of an individual who know-
ingly sent into the state, with an intent to "distribute or to exhibit or
offer to distribute any obscene matter."40 Although the Court rec-
ognized that the state has a compelling interest in regulating ob-
scene materials, the scope of the regulation must be narrow so as to
avoid the suppression of materials that are constitutionally pro-
tected.41 The three factor test, which redefined the Roth test, is as
follows: (1) whether the average person, applying contemporary
community standards would find that the regulation, when consid-
ered in its totality, appeals to the prurient interest; (2) whether the
work depicts or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual con-
duct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (3) the
trier of fact must determine whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. 42 This
standard determines the ultimate validity of the challenged regula-
tion restricting obscenity.43
38. See Merchant, supra note 34, at 435; see also Greg Iskander, American Civil
Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The Provisions of the Commu-
nications Decency Act of 1996 Prohibiting the Transmissions of Obscene or Indecent Material
and Patently Offensive Communications to Persons Under the Age of 18 Violate the First
Amendment, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 816 (1997).
39. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (setting forth current ob-
scenity standard). The criminal prosecution in Miller involved a man who mass-
mailed advertisements of his books, depicting men and women in various sexual
acts. See id. at 18.
40. Id. at 16 (citing Cal. Amended Stats. 1969, c. 249, § 1, at 598). The statute
provides, in relevant part:
Section 311.2: Sending or bringing into state for sale or distribution;
printing, exhibiting, distributing or possessing within the state:
(a) Every person who knowingly: sends or causes to be sent, or brings
or causes to be brought, into this state for sale or distribution, or in this
state prepares, publishes, prints, exhibits, distributes, or offers to dis-
tribute, or has in his possession with intent to distribute or to exhibit or
offer to distribute, any obscene matter is guilty of a misdemeanor ....
Id. at 16-17 n.1.
41. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
42. Id. (holding that prongs of obscenity standard must be strictly construed).
This standard was designed to give notice to potential defendants that the distribu-
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As emphasized in the caselaw, the Court not only creates stan-
dards to determine the nature of the speech and validity of the reg-
ulation but typically must determine what level of scrutiny the First
Amendment mandates for the regulation.4 4 Historically in First
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court designated the appropriate
tier of scrutiny by defining the regulation as either content-based or
content-neutral. 45 Content-based restrictions trigger strict scrutiny
whereas content-neutral regulations garner only an intermediate
scrutiny.4 6 Strict scrutiny requires that the governmental regulation
serve a "compelling state interest" and be "narrowly tailored to
achieve that end."47 Content-neutral regulations, however, will
withstand constitutional scrutiny if they regulate the time, place,
and manner of speech, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
or important governmental interest and "leave open ample chan-
nels of communication."
48
Despite falling within the ambit of the First Amendment's pro-
tection, sexually explicit materials have been classified as having
"slight social value" in their content. 49 Thus, indecent materials
may be regulated to promote a compelling governmental interest,
but only through "narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve
those interests without unnecessarily burdening First Amendment
freedoms." 50 Even though the regulation of indecent materials may
exist, it must withstand a strict scrutiny review.
5 1
The discussion thus far has focused on the classification of
state regulated speech and the level of scrutiny warranted by the
state action. It is also crucial to review the Court's treatment of First
Amendment doctrine with respect to the medium of the speech
44. See Merchant, supra note 34, at 439 (discussing various media and differ-
ing levels of review each receives).
45. SeeVa. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Con-
tent-based regulations are defined as regulations directed at the "communicative
impact" of the speech. Conversely, content-neutral restrictions are those that do
not target specifically the intended message of the speech, even though they may
have that effect. See generally Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
46. See Va. Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 771.
47. See id.
48. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). Es-
sentially, the narrow tailoring requirement provides that the regulation's interest
cannot be as equally served by a means that is substantially less intrusive to the First
Amendment. See id. Furthermore, the alternative channels requirement provides
that a free exchange of ideas still will be protected despite the regulation. See
Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 516 (1981).
49. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978).
50. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
51. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 (determining that content-based regulations
must meet strict scrutiny test).
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and the state's constricted ability to regulate speech within these
contexts.
B. Review of Indecent Speech Regulations in the
Various Contexts
Despite falling within an established framework of constitu-
tional doctrine, regulations of indecent and obscene materials on
the Internet require a more particularized analysis.52 The Court
has treated speech with differing constitutional protections depend-
ing on the medium of the speech.5 3
The first questioned medium was radio broadcasting, which
has become the least protected medium in the free speech spec-
trum.5 4 In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,55 the Court recognized a com-
pelling interest in protecting children from indecent materials over
the radio because radio broadcasts have an "uniquely pervasive
presence in the lives of all Americans" and confront citizens "in the
privacy of their own homes."56 Additionally, the Court determined
that the broadcasting medium is particularly accessible to children
and contains no forewarning of the indecent materials. 57 The spe-
cific issue in Pacifica was whether the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") could limit indecent, but not obscene,
speech. 58 The Court held that the context of speech is determina-
tive of the constitutional protection that will be afforded to the
communication. 59 The Court then upheld the FCC regulation,
withholding constitutional protection of the materials themselves
because they were communicated over the broadcast medium. 60 As
52. See generally Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding that Internet
speech garners First Amendment review).
53. See id.
54. See Werst, supra note 18, at 220 (detailing differences between media and
levels of review).
55. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
56. Id. at 748 (discussing reasons for limited First Amendment protection of
broadcasting).
57. See id. at 748-49 (holding that broadcasting medium is particularly accessi-
ble to children).
58. See id. at 749. This issue was brought forth when a radio station broad-
casted offensive words during the afternoon - hours in which children would be
exposed to the material. See id. at 729-30. The FCC restricted the broadcasting to
certain times of the day to ensure children would not be listening. Id. The FCC
found the authority to implement this regulation via 47 U.S.C. § 30 3 (g) (1934)
and 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976). See id. at 731.
59. See id. at 747-48.
60. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.
2001]
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exemplified by Pacifica, the Court will be less protective of broad-
casted speech than speech in other contexts.61
Cable television is another medium that the Court has treated
with leniency in analyzing speech regulations.62 The relevant case
is Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC,63
which involved three indecency provisions of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992.64 In this case,
the Court struck down two out of the three indecency provisions. 65
More important than the decision itself, however, was the Court's
analysis of the regulation. The Court declined to articulate a tradi-
tional standard to review the regulation or even analogize it to
broadcast or telephonic media.66 Thus, the Court's only guidance
for cable operators was that it would strike down cable operators'
prohibitions on public channels from displaying indecent materi-
als. 67 This seems to suggest the cable television context is, like ra-
dio, highly susceptible to constitutional regulation.68
Unlike the preceding contexts, the telephonic industry has
proven to be subject to far less regulation than any other medium. 69
The predominant case in this area is Sable Communications of Califor-
nia, Inc. v. FCC,70 in which the Court struck down a federal statute
criminalizing the making of any "obscene or indecent communica-
tion for commercial purposes," even if the defendant did not initi-
ate the communication. 71  The Court's reasoning was that
preventing access by minors to these indecent materials was an im-
61. See Werst, supra note 18, at 221 (differentiating broadcasting medium
from other conduits of speech).
62. See id. (noting similarity to broadcast medium because of cable television's
presence has in privacy at home).
63. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
64. See id. at 732. The first provision, 10(a), applied to "leased channels,"
such as channels leased from the operator by unaffiliated programmers. See id. at
734. It allowed operators to ban programming describing or depicting "sexual or
excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured by con-
temporary community standards." Id. The second provision, 10(b), required the
operators to segregate indecent programming onto one channel and to block that
channel if they did not ban entirely the programming. See id. at 735. The third
provision, 10(c), applied to public channels and allowed the operator to prohibit
indecent programming on these channels. See id.
65. See id. at 733 (leaving unresolved which level of First Amendment review
regulations of cable medium warrant).
66. See id.
67. See id. at 734.
68. See Werst, supra note 18, at 222.
69. See id. at 222 (analogizing telephonic medium to Internet context).
70. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
71. See id. at 131.
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portant interest, but a total ban on these materials could not justify
its application; the means were not narrowly tailored to achieve this
interest.72 More generally, telephone services provide users with
the "greatest control over receipt of content than other media. '7 3
Thus, the speech that occurs within the telephonic medium is most
protected because the audience has a particular ability to tune out
the message.74
Not surprisingly, the Court's varying treatment of these differ-
ent contexts has played a key role in the analysis of Internet speech
regulations. The controlling case is Reno v. ACLU,75 in which Con-
gress attempted to criminalize the exposure of indecent materials
to minors by enacting the Communications Decency Act of 1996
("CDA"). There were two provisions in question: first, the CDA
criminalized the use of a "telecommunications device" to transmit
any communication that is obscene or indecent while "knowing
that the recipient of the communication is under 18 [sic] years of
age;" second, the CDA criminalized the use of any "interactive com-
puter service" to display in a manner available to a person under
eighteen any communication that uses "patently offensive" lan-
guage or images. 76 The Court found that both provisions violated
the First Amendment. 77 Justice Stevens, writing the majority opin-
ion, began his analysis with a comparison to the Pacifica case, which
outlined the importance of the speech's context in allocating con-
stitutional protection. 78 Stevens first noted that the Internet had
no prior history of weak First Amendment protection like radio;
therefore, no analogous, binding precedent existed to guide a deci-
sion in the Internet medium. 79 Furthermore, Stevens distinguished
radio from cyberspace by highlighting a computer user's enhanced
ability to control the flow of unsolicited speech by necessitating "af-
firmative steps" to reach the materials. 80 Justice Stevens concluded
72. See id. at 126. The Court found this regulation especially overbroad in
that new technological advances would allow for a more tailored restriction. See id.
73. Werst, supra note 18, at 222.
74. See id. (asserting that control of listener to "tune out" is crucial to ac-
corded First Amendment review).
75. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 858 (1997).
76. Id. at 859-60.
77. See id. at 879 (finding CDA facially overbroad).
78. See id. at 866-67; see also Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 733-49.
79. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 866-67.
80. See id. at 869.
20011
11
LaMaina: Wipe out in ACLU v. Johnson: Can Any Regulation of Surfing the Ne
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001
148 ViLLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JOuRNAL
the analysis by holding the CDA was both unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad. 8'
The Reno Court, in subjecting the CDA to strict scrutiny review,
settled the question of what type of First Amendment protection
the Court would afford the Internet.82 The Court also articulated
an emphasis on the narrow tailoring of cyberspace regulations, sig-
naling that the state may not restrict the free speech rights of adults
in the name of minor protection.83 This decision is essential in de-
termining the constitutionality of any subsequent Internet regula-
tions attacked under the First Amendment.
C. Commerce Clause Analysis of Internet Regulations
In addition to the traditional First Amendment arguments di-
rected against speech regulations, the Internet provides a unique
opportunity for speech restrictions to be challenged on dormant
Commerce Clause grounds.8 4 As succinctly stated by the Court, the
"dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits state ...
regulation that discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate
commerce and thereby 'imped[es] free private trade in the na-
tional marketplace.'1,8 5 The Court's modern approach employs a
complex test, requiring that a state regulation pursue a legitimate
end, be rationally related to that end, and not impose a burden on
interstate commerce that outweighs the state interest.8 6 Further-
more, in certain commerce contexts, the need for national uni-
formity is particularly strong, creating a presumption against any
state regulation.8 7 Thus, the constitutionality of the state regula-
81. See id. at 885. Stevens concluded the CDA was vague because it used dif-
fering terminology in its provisions, creating confusion as to what "indecent" mate-
rial would fall within its scope. See id. at 870-74. It was overbroad because it
restricted the constitutionally protected rights of adults to converse on "indecent"
topics. See id. at 875.
82. See Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1156 (stating that Reno is "central" to resolution of
later Internet cases).
83. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 875.
84. See Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
The Supreme Court has found the Internet to represent an "instrument of inter-
state commerce," and it is therefore subject to analysis under the Commerce
Clause. Id.
85. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1160 (quoting Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437
(1980)); see also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (holding that
burden imposed on interstate commerce cannot be clearly excessive to local
benefits).
86. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITrrIoNAL LAw § 6-5 (2d ed.
1988).
87. See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (holding that Arizona stat-
ute prohibiting operation of trains with more than fourteen passenger cars or sev-
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tion often depends on this balancing of local concern versus na-
tional interest in uniformity and free commerce. 88
American Libraries Ass'n v. Patak'39 applied this general dormant
Commerce Clause analysis specifically to the Internet.90 The regu-
lation in question was a New York statute criminalizing the dissemi-
nation of obscene materials to minors over the 'Net. 91 The district
court noted that the "menace" of varying state regulations in the
Internet context inevitably implicates a Commerce Clause analysis
because the Clause represents "the framers' [sic] reaction to over-
reaching by the individual states that might jeopardize the growth
of the nation [and] the national infrastructure of communications
and trade .... ,,92 Acting consistently with this intent, the district
court struck down the statute.93 The court then went even further
by stating that the Commerce Clause "ordains that only Congress
can legislate" in the area of the Internet.94 Thus, the Pataki court
suggested that any state regulation of the Internet will be subject to
the strictest of standards for fear of inconsistent and injurious re-
strictions on commerce.95
enty freight cars was unconstitutional). The transportation arena has been
paradigmatic of this need for national uniformity in interstate commerce. See id.;
see also Wabash v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
88. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of the Port of Pa., 53 U.S. 299 (1851) (focus-
ing on distinction between national matter or local concern being regulated); see
also Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (striking down local
regulations preventing importing of milk). The Court also may consider whether
the means are necessary in achieving the legitimate state objective to determine
undue burden. See TIUBE, supra note 38, § 6-5; see also Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 355.
89. 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
90. See id. at 173.
91. See id. at 163 (discussing New York statute that criminalized dissemination
of harmful materials to minors). The court noted that this "New York Act," New
York Penal Law § 235.21(3), was "only one of many efforts by state legislators to
control the chaotic environment of the Internet." Id. at 168.
92. Id. at 169 (citing Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992));
see also THE FEDERALIST Nos. 7, 11 (Alexander Hamilton).
93. See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 169 (holding Internet regulation violative under
dormant Commerce Clause grounds). The court struck down the statute under
three Commerce Clause arguments. See id. First, the Act regulated conduct occur-
ring wholly outside the state of New York. Second, the burden on interstate com-
merce exceeded the local benefit of protecting children from indecent materials.
Third, the Internet context itself is an area necessitating national, uniform regula-
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V. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the legal conclusions of the district
court in ACLU v. Johnson, finding that the New Mexico statute vio-
lated both the First Amendment and the Commerce Clause. 96 The
court first held that the statute could not be upheld under First
Amendment strict scrutiny review, as applied in the most recent
analogous case, Reno v. ACLU 97 Second, the court held that even if
the statute could withstand the First Amendment challenge, it
would fail under a Commerce Clause analysis because it regulated
conduct outside New Mexico, unduly burdened interstate com-
merce, and imposed inconsistent regulation on Internet users.98
A. The Tenth Circuit's First Amendment Analysis
The Tenth Circuit first outlined the rationale of the district
court's finding that the statute violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 99 The government, in the area of Internet regula-
tion, is required to advance a "compelling governmental interest"
and to show evidence that the state employed the "least restrictive
means of serving its stated interest" for the court to uphold a pro-
tected speech regulation. 100 Furthermore, the court found the
materials covered under the statute in question to be protected
speech; it noted that the Supreme Court has held that "sexual ex-
pression which is indecent but is not obscene is protected by the
First Amendment."10 1 In fact, the Court specifically has held that
this "content-based regulation of Internet speech" is subject to the
strictest scrutiny. 102 Thus, in Johnson, the defendants asserted that
section 30-37-3.2(A) of the New Mexico statute must be read nar-
96. SeeACLU v.Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1152 (10th Cir. 1999). Specifically,
the Tenth Circuit upheld the grant of the preliminary injunction barring enforce-
ment of the statute. Id. The requirements for a movant to be granted injunctive
relief are: (1) the movant will suffer irreparable harm unless the injunction is is-
sued; (2) there is substantial likelihood the movant will ultimately prevail on the
merits; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs any harm the proposed
injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) the injunction would not be
contrary to public policy. Id. at 1155 (citing Kiowa Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Hoo-
ver, 150 F.3d 1163, 1171 (10th Cir. 1998)).
97. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1156.
98. See id. at 1160-61.
99. See id. at 1155-56.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1156 (quoting Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 126 (1989)).
102. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1156. The Supreme Court has determined the levels
of scrutiny accorded to various types of speech based on the nature of the medium
itself. See id. at 1156. After concluding in Reno that the Internet is more like print
media than broadcast media, the Court found that regulations of this medium
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rowly in order to fulfill its constitutional requirements. 10 3 The de-
fendants relied heavily on Ginsberg v. New York, 104 wherein a
conviction for selling harmful materials in the print medium to a
minor was upheld. 10 5 The plaintiffs and the Tenth Circuit, how-
ever, focused almost entirely on Reno v. ACLU in their arguments
and analysis. 10 6 The court concluded that Reno was not distinguish-
able from the present case, and the statutory similarities did "com-
pel the same result. 10 7
As stated earlier, the argument put forth to defend the stat-
ute's constitutionality was that section 30-37-3.2(A) could be read
narrowly so as to "not apply to group communications which in-
clude both adults and minors in the group, or where a fact situation
presents a mere probability that minors may be part of the receiv-
ing group. '1 0 8 The defendants highlighted that the same definition
of "harmful to minors" in Ginsberg was employed in this statute,
thereby making this merely an "electronic Ginsberg case." 109 The
court rejected this characterization of the case at hand, finding that
there are stark differences between the media of magazines in print
and cyberspace. 110 Because of these differences, a narrow reading
of the statute, as applied in Ginsberg, was not immediately appar-
warranted the strictest scrutiny available under First Amendment analysis. See id.
(citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)).
103. See Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1156 (asserting that narrow reading of statute
would fulfill constitutional requirements).
104. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
105. See id. at 644.
106. See Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1155 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)).
107. Id. at 1158.
108. Id. (quoting Appellants' Br. at 19). The defendants argued that the stat-
ute only applies in specific situations: "(1) communications using a computer com-
munications system in which (2) the sender deliberately ('knowingly and
intentionally') (3) sends a message which is 'harmful to minors' as defined in sec-
tion 30-37-3.2(A) . . . (4) to a specific individual recipient who the sender know to
be a minor." Id. (quotations in original).
109. Id. at 1158 n.7; see generally Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
110. See Johnson, 194 F.3d at 158. One difference was that the prohibition
against magazine sales to minors allowed parents to purchase these materials for
their children; the statute in question here and the CDA in Reno did not. See id. In
addition, the statute in Ginsberg applied only to commercial transactions and the
applicable minor age was seventeen years old. Section 30-37-3.2(A) defines a mi-
nor as being under age eighteen and applies to non-commercial transactions as
well. See id. Finally, the very essence of the material, a magazine, varied greatly
from cyberspace communications. Magazines can be "hidden in the backroom"
and regulated on a face-to-face basis. The Internet, however, does not "distinguish
between minors and adults in their audience." Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1158; see also
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ent. 11' The court then analyzed whether a narrow reading was oth-
erwise appropriate in that the statute is "readily susceptible to the
limitation" imposed by its construction.' 12 The court held that the
proposed narrow reading of the statute would be plausible only if
the Court itself essentially rewrote the statute, which it declined to
do. 113 First, the statute criminalized "knowingly and intentionally
initiat[ing] or engag[ing] in communication with a [minor]."114 It
was not limited to, as the defendants argued, one-on-one communi-
cations with a minor. 115 Thus, the court could not constrict artifi-
cially the scope of the statute by interpreting it as narrowly, in this
respect, as the defendants argued.11 6 Second, defendants argued
that the intent clause of the statute, by definition, finely tailored its
scope.1 17 The court, determined that under the broad definition of
intent included in the statute, "virtually all" communications on the
Internet would meet this threshold of potential liability.118 Thus,
the court held the intent clause served no narrowing function in
interpreting the statute. 119 Finally, the court stated that the de-
fenses contained in the statute would be inconsistent with the de-
fendants' own asserted interpretation.1 20 Certain defenses
presuppose the speaker's ignorance that he or she is communicat-
ing with a minor; these include a good faith defense or asking for a
credit card number or age verification. 121 Accepting this fact, the
statute could not then be said to impose liability only on those who
111. See Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1159.
112. Id. (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers' Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397
(1988)). The Supreme Court has held that the judiciary should not "rewrite a
state law to conform it to constitutional requirements." Id.
113. See id. at 1159-60.
114. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2(A) (Michie 1998).
115. See Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1159 (noting that defendants' interpretation
would lead to "absurd" result that no violation would occur if someone sent mes-
sage to two minors, minor and adult, or chat room of minors).
116. See id. (holding that court will not re-write violative statute).
117. See id. The statutory definition of "knowingly" requires only "having gen-
eral knowledge of, or reason to know, or a belief or ground for belief which war-
rants further inspection or inquiry of... the age of the minor." N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-37-3.2(G).
118. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1159; see also Reno, 521 U.S. at 876 (stating that ab-
sent viable age verification process, senders are "charged with knowing" that one
or more minors will likely view material at issue). The Supreme Court addressed
this exact issue in Reno, stating that the "knowledge" and "specific person" require-
ments simply could not remedy the overbreadth of the statute itself. Johnson, 194
F.3d at 1159 n.8.
119. See Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1159.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 1159-60 (stating that defendants' arguments contradict in terms
of a narrow reading of regulation).
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intentionally communicate with minors. 122 The court concluded
that the very existence of these statutory defenses undermined the
credibility of the defendants' narrow reading of the statute.
123
Having rejected the defendants' narrow interpretation argu-
ment, the court next addressed the assertion that the statutory de-
fenses themselves provided the "sort of 'narrow tailoring' that
would save an otherwise patently invalid unconstitutional provi-
sion. 1 24 On this point, the court referred to Reno and rejected the
defendants' contentions, holding that the defenses were ineffective,
even "illusory" and, therefore, unable to vitiate the statute's
overbreadth. 125
B. Commerce Clause Analysis
Although the Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs exhibited a
likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment claim,
the court continued with its analysis of the statute under Commerce
Clause review.1 26 It affirmed the lower court's finding that section
30-37-3.2 (A) violated the dormant Commerce Clause in three ways:
"(1) it regulate [d] conduct occurring wholly outside of the state of
New Mexico; (2) it constitute[d] an unreasonable and undue bur-
den on interstate and foreign commerce; and (3) it subject[ed] in-
terstate use of the Internet to inconsistent state regulation."
127
Furthermore, the court noted that it must be particularly sensitive
to Commerce Clause issues because the nature of the Internet is
such that it is not confined by any sort of jurisdictional boundaries,
typically related to geography, which would protect against inconsis-
tent regulation. 128
122. See id. The court suggested that the fact that the defenses were "directed
at group communications that have unique dynamics on the Internet" intimated
that the general prohibition was intended to include such group communications.
Id. at 1160.
123. See id.
124. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 882 (1997).
125. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1160; see also Reno, 521 U.S. at 882. The defendants
in this case had not demonstrated any reason why these defenses would be effec-
tive in actually preventing minors from accessing these harmful materials on the
Internet so as to distinguish them from Reno. See id.; see also Cyberspace, Commu-
nications, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 751 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
126. See Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1160.
127. Id. at 1160-61.
128. See id. at 1161. Geography is a "virtually meaningless construct on the
Internet," and therefore courts must be highly acute in detecting inconsistent reg-
ulation imposed on a variety of actors. Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp.
160, 168-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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The defendants' first argument was that section 30-37-3.2(A)
only reaches intrastate conduct.1 29 The court rejected this argu-
ment on two grounds. First, the statute contained no express provi-
sion restricting its application solely to communication within its
borders. 130 Additionally, the very essence of the Internet as a me-
dium disables a state from purporting such limited application of a
state statute. 131 Thus, the court concluded that the statute did at-
tempt to regulate interstate conduct and was a per se violation of
the Commerce Clause. l3 2
The defendants' second argument was that the burden on in-
terstate commerce imposed by the statute did not outweigh the lo-
cal benefit in protecting minors from harmful, sexually explicit
materials.'3 3 The court acknowledged that the asserted local bene-
fit was a compelling state interest, but it stated that the real issue in
Johnson was whether the means chosen to further the interest "ex-
cessively burden interstate commerce compared to the local bene-
fits the statute actually confers.' 3 4 The court held that they did
not; the benefits were minimal, especially if the defendants' own
narrow interpretation of the statute were adopted.13 5 These small
potential benefits were almost subsumed by the excessive burden
on interstate commerce imposed by section 30-37-3.2(A).' 36 Fur-
thermore, the court declared that even the prosecution of parties
beyond the borders of New Mexico triggered immense practical dif-
129. See Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1161. Defendants also initially argued that recre-
ational use of the Internet is not "commerce," and therefore the statute was not
subject to Commerce Clause limitations. See id. The court noted that the defend-
ants "wisely" withdrew this assertion. Id.
130. See id. It rather applied to any communication that fits "within the prohi-
bition and over which [New Mexico] has the capacity to exercise criminal jurisdic-
tion." Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 169.
131. See Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1161. Even if the communication in question is
an email from one New Mexican resident to another, it cannot be guaranteed that
the email "would not travel through other states en route." Id. (citing Pataki, 969 F.
Supp. at 171).
132. See id.
133. See id.; see also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); V-1
Oil Co. v. Utah State Dep't. of Pub. Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1423-24 (10th Cir. 1997).
134. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1161.
135. See id. Another district court noted with regard to the CDA that
"[n]early half of Internet communications originate outside the United States ....
Pornography from, say, Amsterdam will be no less appealing to a child on the
Internet ... and residents of Amsterdam have little incentive to comply with [the
statute]." ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 882 (E.D.Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844
(1997). Thus, the benefits when viewed from the standpoint of the statute's effi-
cacy were small at best. See Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1162.
136. See Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1162 (citing Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 179).
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ficulties in implementation. 137 Therefore, the court held that the
high burden on interstate commerce that the statute created was
not outweighed by the minimal and dubious benefits asserted. 138
The court found that section 30-37-3.2(A) violated the Commerce
Clause because it "constitute[d] an invalid indirect regulation of
interstate commerce. ' 13
9
The third ground upon which the court found section 30-37-
3.2(A) to be a violation of the Commerce Clause was its imposition
of inconsistent regulation on Internet users.1 40 The court, having
stated that certain types of commerce require national regulation,
found the Internet to be the exact kind of medium to necessitate
such uniform regulation. 14 1 Similar to the transportation context,
the Internet is an area of national, even global, concern, which re-
quires uniform regulation so that "users are reasonably able to de-
termine their obligations." 14 2 New Mexico, in attempting to
regulate Internet activity, overstepped its constitutional bounds by
regulating an area that requires uniform resolution under the dor-
mant Commerce Clause.1 4
3
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In Johnson, the Tenth Circuit consistently followed the prece-
dent of the Supreme Court in handling a state's attempt to regulate
sexually explicit materials on the Internet. The reasoning of the
court in both the First Amendment and Commerce Clause contexts
was congruous with the current trend of striking down regulation
in this medium. This section will analyze the internal consistencies
of this reasoning and how the court's conclusions will shape future
attempts at regulating the Internet.
A. First Amendment Barrier to Regulating the Internet
The Tenth Circuit found that the New Mexico statute criminal-
izing dissemination of materials harmful to minors was unconstitu-
137. See id.




141. See Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1162 (citing Wabash, 118 U.S. at 574-75).
142. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 182; see also Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1162; Kenneth D.
Bassinger, Dormant Commerce Clause Limits on State Regulation of the Internet: The
Transportation Analogy, 32 GA. L. REv. 889, 904 (1998).
143. See Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1162.
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tional on overbreadth grounds.144 The statute, while potentially
effective in regulating its intended speech, also burdened otherwise
protected adult communications on the Internet and failed First
Amendment scrutiny. 145 However, this Note thus far has built a
foundation for the assertion that under a Johnson court analysis, fol-
lowing the Supreme Court's lead in Reno, any Internet regulation
will fall under First Amendment review.
The Reno Court highlighted the fact that the medium itself cre-
ates an almost unworkable base from which to fashion regula-
tions.1 46 The court in Johnson agreed, stating that the closest
analogy to the Internet medium was the telephone medium, which
garnered strict scrutiny.147 Therefore, Internet regulations, if they
are to survive at all, must meet the strictest of constitutional
standards. 148
Meeting this high threshold in the context of the Internet is
virtually impossible because of the very "pervasiveness" and "inva-
siveness" of the medium.1 49 The only viable way in which to achieve
the state's goal of protecting minors is to limit all Internet materials
to content that is appropriate for minors. 150 Although it has tradi-
tionally recognized the need for such protection, the Supreme
Court has consistently "leaned against measures which limit the
speech of adults, even when the motive was to protect children."51
Thus, there is an inevitable tension between the two prongs of a
strict scrutiny analysis when Internet regulations are reviewed
under the First Amendment. In creating lawful regulations that af-
fect indecent speech, legislators must "narrowly tailor the regula-
144. See id. at 1149 (finding that New Mexico statute regulating interstate
commerce criminalized otherwise protected speech).
145. See id.
146. See ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997) (asserting that Internet con-
text creates unique dilemma in regulating in accordance with First Amendment
principles).
147. See Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1156 n.4 (reviewing Reno in its comparison of
various speech media).
148. See id.
149. See Werst, supra note 18, at 225.
150. See id. at 226-27 (stating that government may not "limit the adult popu-
lation to only content that is fit for children").
151. Id. at 226; see also Playboy Entm't Group v. United States, 945 F. Supp.
772, 785-86 (1997). The legislative history of the CDA suggested that the drafting
was based on a fear of growing pornography on the Internet. SeeWerst, supra note
18, at 226. This concern was fueled by a study conducted at Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity that found that "approximately one-third of the most frequently visited In-
ternet sites were pornographic and nearly eight-five percent of all images posted
on the Internet were pornographic." Id. at 226-27. This study was later discredited
because of poor methodology and questionable ethics. See id.
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don to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral interest
of shielding minors .... ,,152 Thus, an Internet regulation never
truly can be effective in achieving its compelling governmental in-
terest by narrowly tailoring its scope to the protection of minors
without violating constitutional norms. 153
B. The Commerce Clause Dilemma in Internet Regulation
As the court in Johnson held, state regulations of materials on
the Internet will generally fall under a Commerce Clause analy-
sis.154 The Tenth Circuit strictly followed the reasoning of Pataki,
the first and leading case to find a regulation of Internet activity
invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause. 155 The Pataki court's
reasoning was that the legitimate state interest in protecting minors
from harm would not have been achieved significantly by the anti-
pornography statute. 156 Thus, the "slight efficacy" of the statute did
not "outweigh the strong national interest in keeping the Internet
free of inconsistent regulations that produce a chilling effect on its
development."1 57 In Johnson, the court again highlighted this lan-
guage that a state attempting to regulate interstate conduct occur-
ring wholly outside of its borders is a "per se violation of the
Commerce Clause."1 58 Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit agreed with
Pataki in that the potential local benefits of this statute, purported
as the protection of minors, are actually very small.159 Already ex-
isting laws which are not tailored specifically to Internet speech
may already serve these protectionist measures, whereas matters not
within their scope are no more resolved by the enactment of a state
statute. Thus, the heavy burden on the national economic market-
place needlessly outweighs the tenuous benefits from the statute. 160
152. Werst, supra note 18, at 227.
153. See id. In addition to the difficulty in meeting a strict scrutiny standard,
regulations like the one in Johnson also have an enormous chilling effect on consti-
tutionally protected speech, which hampers their ability to pass First Amendment
review. See id. at 231-32. Furthermore, the global nature of the Internet adds an-
other notch to the ineffectiveness of national or state regulations. See id. at 237.
154. See Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1160 (holding that Internet regulation violated
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine).
155. See Bassinger, supra note 142, at 916 (citing Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki,
969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
156. See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 173 (finding anti-pornography regulation of
Internet unconstitutional because it burdened interstate commerce).
157. Bassinger, supra note 142, at 916.
158. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1161.
159. See id. (employing Pike balancing test).
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The central synthesis of Pataki and Johnson is their mutual con-
centration on the unique nature of the cyberspace medium, declar-
ing that the Internet "like ... rail and highway traffic... requires a
cohesive national scheme of regulation so that users are reasonably
able to determine their obligations." 16 1 Thus, the only laws that will
be effective in withstanding a constitutional challenge will be those
that accomplish no more than generally applicable laws and pose
no additional burden on interstate Internet commerce. 16 2 These
regulations, however, are futile functionally because their pro-
scribed activity would already be illegal under existing laws.16 3 Not
only would such regulations be superfluous and inefficacious in af-
fording any more protection to minors, they would be detrimental
to the free marketplace of the Internet by imposing a chilling effect
on speech and commerce.1 64 Coupled with the need for consistent,
uniform regulations to "foster the development of online com-
merce," a worthwhile state statute, regulating the Internet by ad-
ding to the protection of minors, never ultimately will pass
Commerce Clause muster.1 65
VI. IMPACT
Johnson is a benchmark decision that will invariably guide state
and federal legislators in drafting regulations of indecent materials
on the Internet. In both the First Amendment and Commerce
Clause contexts, the Johnson decision offers assistance to legislators
in a negative capacity; it will undoubtedly become a primer on how
161. Id. (quoting Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 182).
162. See Bassinger, supra note 142, at 924-25.
163. See id. (asserting that states should refrain from attempting to regulate
Internet materials).
164. See id. The Bassinger article stated that because state Internet regula-
tions "which would not offend the dormant commerce clause are indistinguishable
in effect from existing state laws simply proscribing illegal activity, the Internet
regulations should not even be enacted in the first place." Id. at 925.
165. Id. Bassinger argued that:
The Internet, as an instrument of interstate commerce, embodies the
same national interests and demands the same uniform federal regula-
tion as the more traditional channels of interstate commerce. These na-
tional interests justify a uniform base of laws rather than the menace of
inconsistent state regulation. Under this Dormant Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence, state Internet regulation that imposes burdensome require-
ments on nonresident participation in online commerce should be
invalidated. The Internet should be marked off as a national preserve
subject only to uniform federal regulation, and states should therefore
refrain from enacting laws purporting to regulate activity in the truly
global realm of cyberspace.
Bassinger, supra note 142, at 926.
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not to draft constitutionally sound, Internet regulations. Although
this critical guidance will be invaluable in shaping a new crop of
cyberspace statutes, the Tenth Circuit's decision in Johnson inevita-
bly poses a problem to eager legislators.
166
Johnson, buttressed by uncontroverted Supreme Court prece-
dent, gives states very little hope of ever validly restricting materials
on the Internet. 1 67 Ironically, as we enter an era of burgeoning
reliance on Internet communications, the need for such effective
legislation will only increase. 168 The Johnson decision resolves that
this necessary legislation must come from the national government
and must be narrowly tailored to effectuate its goal of protecting
minors from explicit materials on this singular medium. 169 To up-
hold valued constitutional principles while still exercising an un-
precedented ability to regulate cyberspace communications, the
burden of shielding our youth from the sometimes deleterious ef-
fects of Internet use must lie ultimately on Congress, the Internet
industry and our parents. 70 With such a wave of constitutional ob-
stacles flowing from Johnson, state legislatures must take a cue from
the court and simply wait out this tide of Internet legislation.
1 7 1
Jennifer LaMaina
166. See Werst, supra note 18, at 232.
167. See id.
168. See Bassinger, supra note 142, at 926. Since 1989 the Internet "has been
growing at about one hundred percent per year," and it is expected to continue at
this rate well into the current decade. Id. at 926 n.1.
169. See Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1162.
170. See Werst, supra note 18, at 240. Some legal theorists argue:
Ultimately, there may not be a proper legislative response to the indecent
content on the Internet, and Congress may be forced to look to interna-
tional solutions, the technological industry itself, or rely on the "police
power" of a parent in the home. This may be the true beauty of the
Internet, since this could be the first time in American history that a form
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